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And we cannot accuse Pole of losing sight of the forest by a focus
on the trees or the pine cones or the family of pine bark beetles living beneath a single tree. No, his book is for the reader who wants
an accessible intellectual history that places law, and the common
law in particular, in a prism from which to examine the refractions
and spectra as they map onto the most important principles of
modern life.
DANAYA WRIGHT

University of Florida
SHELDON D. POLLACK. War, Revenue, and State Building: Financing
the Developmentof theAmerican State. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009. 328 pp. $69.95 (cloth); $24.95 (paper).
Scholars have long been interested in exploring the historical
links between war making and state building. Indeed, throughout
history the two events have frequently gone hand in hand. As the
historical sociologist Charles Tilly has aptly noted, "States make war
and wars make states." For the most part, however, the academic
literature on warfare and state formation has been rather Euro-centric. The canonical works of historical social scientists like Charles
Tilly, Michael Mann, and others have focused mainly on how wars
and conflicts have been the key transformative events in the rise of
the modern, western European nation-state. In more recent years,
scholars have focused greater attention not only on other parts of
the world, but on the specific casual mechanisms that link wars to
political development, notably the varied processes of raising the
revenue necessary to wage wars.
Sheldon D.Pollack's new book, War, Revenue, and State Building: Financing the Development of the American State, is the latest
addition to a growing literature that investigates how the process
of revenue extraction that accompanied wars shaped American political development. Pollack's main aim is less to provide a new
scholarly reinterpretation of the rise of the American fiscal-military
state than it isto offer an accessible synthesis of the existing literature on war making, revenue extraction, and American political development. As he explains (p. 6), the central goal of the book isto
"elucidate the linkages between the sources of public revenue

available to the American state at specific junctures of its history,
the revenue strategies pursued by its political leaders in response
to these factors, and the consequential impact of the revenue
strategies on the development of the American state."
Yet, Pollack's book does much more than that. Through his
prodigious research in the vast secondary sources on state-formation and American history, Pollack places the American experience
in a broader theoretical and comparative perspective. Early chapters
of the book concisely summarize the work of social theorists and
historians of early modern Europe who have provided generations
of scholars with a model of how weak principalities have developed
into complex political organizations through the crucible of war and
revenue extraction. In his more specific historical analysis of the
United States, Pollack builds on recent studies to argue that the peculiar timing of events in America set it on a unique historical path.
On the continent, "democracy took root after strong central states
had already emerged." By contrast, "representative institutions and
democratic mores were already firmly established in America before
the central state developed" (p. 17, emphasis in the original). Consequently, Pollack contends (p. 18), "this different sequencing of
events in America (i.e., democracy preceding state development)
resulted in a very different kind of state-one that isinternally weak
(i.e., in exerting its powers within its territories) even as it is externally strong (vis- -vis other states)."
With this comparative and theoretical perspective, Pollack illustrates just how weak the central state may have been during
formative periods of American development. For example, in his
chapter on the Early Republic and the Articles of Confederation, Pollack wryly notes (p. 156) how the failure of the early Confederacy's
requisition system meant that even "the medieval princes of 12th
century Europe were better equipped to raise revenue for their
armies than was the debt-ridden Congress of the Confederacy of
the United States of America." Likewise, in his investigation of the
Civil War, Pollack highlights the similarities between 18th century
England and the North in the way that they both sustained a huge
military apparatus by taxing a thriving commercial economy.
But if Pollack's use of a broad comparative and theoretical
framework is one of the book's strengths, it is also at times a limitation. The reliance on an ideal-typical definition of the nation-state

and a focus on the development of centralized political power in
Europe over the course of millennia occasionally obscures as much
as it enlightens. Defining a "strong" state as one that has a large
military complex and a centralized bureaucratic administration is
merely one way to envision the exercise of political power. Though
this definition has informed a tremendous amount of scholarship,
American historians have recently challenged this notion by showing how political power has been more dispersed, yet equally powerful, throughout the development of the American state. To his
credit, Pollack does not ignore this new revisionist literature, but
rather than engage these findings directly, he seems content to rely
on a conventional narrative about the emergence of centralized
American state capacities.
Similarly, using the European "fiscal-military" state as a model
to measure American political development, as Pollack does, appears to provide an overly deterministic view of historical change.
Although Pollack in his early chapters acknowledges the importance
of attending to particular social, economic, and political contexts,
his historical tale frequently seems to follow a functionalist route
that leaves little room for historical contingency. While we are reminded of the financing options that American leaders confronted
during critical wars, the ultimate decisions appear preordained by
the sheer demand for wartime revenue. Much of the complex and
contested nature of American wartime tax policy becomes subordinated to a traditional story about how political elites turn to the
most effective forms of revenue extraction to wage wars, and subsequently to provide social-welfare benefits. With the evolution of
the modern European nation-state as the backdrop, the American
fiscal state simply becomes another political species in the Darwinian process of natural selection.
Despite these drawbacks, Pollack has written a useful account
of the dynamic interaction between wars, taxation, and state building. Although experts in American political and fiscal history may
not find much that is new in the study, Pollack's clear and succinct
writing and the ambitious scale and scope of his investigation will
surely make this book a solid contribution to scholarship and an
ideal monograph for course adoption.
AJAY K. MEHROTRA
Indiana University-Bloomington

